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And here, in passing, I would notice a point which is
well worthy of attention. Kepler had deduced his laws
from observation. As far back as those observations ex-
tended, the planetary motions had obeyed these laws ; and,
neither Kepler nor Newton entertained a doubt as to their
continuing to obey them. Year after year, as the ages
rolled, they believed that those laws would continue to
illustrate themselves in the heavens. But this was not suf-
ficient. The scientific mind can 'find no repose in the mere
registration of sequence in Nature. The further question
intrudes itself with resistless might: whence comes the se-
quence? What is it that bindsjthe consequent with its an-
tecedent in Nature ? The truly scientific intellect never can
attain rest until it reaches the forces by which the observed
succession is produced. It was thus with Torricelli; it was
thus with Newton; it is thus preeminently with the real
scientific man of to-day. In common with the most igno«
rant, he shares the belief that spring will succeed winter,
that summer will succeed spring, that autumn will suCceed
summer, and that winter will succeed autumn. But he
knows still further—~and this knowledge is essential to his
intellectual repose—~that this succession, besides being per-
manent, is, under the circumstances, necessary; that the
gravitating force exerted between the sun, and a revolving
spherewvith an axis inclined to the plane of its orbit, must
produce the observed succession of the seasons. Not until
this relation between forces and phenomena has been es-
tablished is the law of reason rendered concentric with the
law of Nature, and not until this is effected does the mind
of the scientific philosopher rest in peace.

The expectation of likeness,.then, in the precession of
phenomena is not that on which the scientific mind founds
its belief in the order of Nature. If the force be permanent
the phenomena are necessary, Whether they resemble or do
not resemble any thing that has gone before. Hence, in

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